Thor’s Day: Autonomy and altruism

Valuing autonomy for the least of these

By Kyle Garza

The self-made man is the American hero, an icon of personal autonomy that overcomes every obstacle in his way and flourishes despite opposition. Thomas Edison was frowned upon by his teachers due to his wandering mind, Walt Disney was told he lacked creativity, Elvis was told he couldn’t sing, and Michael Jordan was once cut by his high school basketball team. Yet all were still given the opportunity to strive to make something of themselves: truly, the American dream fully realized.
    But what can be said of the unmade man? Or, in the very least, what can be said of the men and women still growing in utero? What opportunities lie ahead of them and their parents? Questions like these are often dismissed as merely begging the question: “it cannot be said that the cells growing in a woman are truly a person.” Often, for more personal reasons, the question is cut short by the mother who just isn’t ready, the father who just doesn’t care, or the doctor who just doesn’t think it wise. Ultimately, what is still being questioned is whether or not “the unmade” are men and women at all deserving the same degree of respect for their autonomy as we having the discussion.
    While the lives in question are small, the question itself is of no small significance. Being responsible for the deaths of nearly six million Jews during World War II, Adolf Hitler is commonly labeled a monster for his heinous crimes against humanity. Yet since the landmark case of Roe v. Wade in 1973, which decided that a right to privacy under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment extended to a woman’s decision to have an abortion, an estimated 50 million abortions have been conducted in the U.S. alone. [“Abortion Incidence and Access to Services in the United States,” accessed April 4] The subject is thus nothing with which to be trifled: if embryos are people too, then we have valued privacy, autonomy, and burden-free living over actual human lives in millions of cases that would make history’s most infamous tyrant blush.
    But the abortion rights debate has, in the last score of years, begun to change with the science of the day. The very definition of humanity has begun to include earlier and earlier forms of life across the spectrum for scientists, yet the very definition of “pregnancy” has not followed suit in the minds of many doctors. If, in the future, the definition of “pregnancy” universally extends beyond implantation to the earlier form of conception, that definition may inevitably lead to a reversal of our societal value of privacy and the value of human lives. It is becoming much less a matter of constitutional rights and much more a matter of scientific definitions. Eventually, the legal interpretations will have to change in order to match the science of the day.

But what will it take to convince the masses that humans in utero are, in fact, also persons? What remains to be established with complete confidence is whether or not developing humans in utero ought to be considered “persons” at all, and if so, whether or not they deserve the same rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as their mothers. In keeping with the American dream (the pursuit of realizing one’s full potential of prospering through one’s own efforts), the majority of pro-abortion society has taken up arms in supporting the active prosperity of the mother over the potential prosperity of the unborn. Contemporary American culture celebrates the power of autonomy in every person’s life. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that the unborn have the same fundamental human rights as their mothers, then alternate options to abortion must be explored with the utmost and most sedulous care by all members of society and not merely the mothers, fathers, and physicians commonly involved in the abortion decision.

    For this reason, Christopher Kaczor [rhymes with razor] pursues several lines of argumentation that advocate for the humanity and personhood of the unborn. If indeed the distinction between humanity and personhood is a philosophical one, then it rests in the same field of axiology that yields our human sense of morality. Kaczor argues that one of the most determining factors of human personhood is to “actually have the genetic basis to be moral agents.” [S. Matthew Liao, “The Basis of Human Moral Status,” quoted by Kaczor in The Ethics of Abortion, hereafter abbreviated Ethics] In this way, Kaczor accepts a line of reasoning that does not require the supposition of a religious deity for our human sense of morality. In an effort to find the “minimum” requirements of personhood that will merit innate human rights, Kaczor finds that we must be reductionist in our approach. This way, the atheist and the Christian alike can discuss the issue without appearing to rely upon fundamentalist contentions. Reductionism leads one to conclude, as many others have, that the inception of humanity begins at conception: the point at which two single strands of DNA from the parents become a double-strand, what we today know to call the double-helix strand of DNA that will, unless otherwise acted upon, inevitably result in a unique, new human life. If morality exists anywhere in human beings, it must have its roots in our unique strands of DNA. If a fertilized egg has the DNA that will eventually lead to a moral agent, then personhood is unquestionable.

If potential moral agency is not cause enough to believe in the personhood of the unborn, then perhaps potential rational beings will be. After all, it is easy to prefer the comfort and prosperity of a rationally thinking, speaking woman over the life of an unborn whose very lack of rationality (due to the lack of a developed brain) might lead one to conclude that no personhood is violated in the abortion of such a life. But to Kaczor’s mind, “[t]o say that the human being in utero is not a rational being because he or she is not functioning rationally makes as much sense as saying that a human being is not gendered male or female unless in the act of successfully reproducing.” [Ethics] The answer once again lies merely in the DNA of the life in question; here we must face the obvious scientific fact: “Successful reproduction follows from the endowment (from conception) as female or male, and it is from this endowment that the organs emerge, secondary sex characteristics develop, and reproductive activity becomes possible.” [Ethics] Kaczor further points out that even if reproduction never occurs in that individual’s life, we would still rationally consider him or her male or female. Speaking of the unborn in terms of male and female may be one more necessary step in humanizing the depersonalized. While the sex of the unborn cannot be conclusively determined by doctors until 17 to 20 weeks, it is obvious that that information is still rooted in the genetic code of the unborn’s DNA, DNA that forms at conception.
    It should here be noted all the more that this stance on defining humanity and personhood is not merely presupposed by the merely “fundamentalist religious types” in America. On the contrary, the vast majority of biologists, scientists, and physicians agree that a new, unique human life begins at conception. Insofar as autonomy is concerned and the American individual is highly valued, it ought to remain uncontested that “[t]he formation, maturation, and meeting of a male and female sex cell are all preliminary to their actual union into a combined cell, or zygote, which definitely marks the beginning of a new individual.” [Leslie Brainerd Arey, Developmental Anatomy, quoted in Ethics] Even if the word itself sounds non-personal and scientific enough to only be appropriate for a lab or in medical professional jargon, “This [zygote] is the beginning of a human being.” [Keith L. Moor, Before We Are Born, quoted in Ethics] That conclusion is gaining all the more traction as its understanding is disseminated even at the congressional level:

Physicians, biologists, and other scientists agree that conception marks the beginning of the life of a human being—a being that is alive and is a member of the human species. There is overwhelming agreement on this point in countless medical, biological, and scientific writings. [Cited by Randy Alcorn in Prolife Answers to Prochoice Arguments, quoted in Ethics]

    Undeniably, the very core of our biological humanity rests in our 46 chromosomes, a combination of 23 from the sperm and 23 from the ovum. While the individual cells have merely potential humanity within them (half of it), the zygote has actual, realized humanity, hence it ought to be considered “a member of the kind homo sapiens rather than simply a ‘heap’ of cells of human origin.” [Maureen L. Condic, First Things, quoted in Ethics] Kaczor compares the loss of a human embryo to the loss of skin cells for demonstrative effect: while the skin cells are without doubt a mere part of the autonomous whole, the human embryo “is a person” because its cells “work together in a coordinated effort of self-development towards maturity.” [Ethics]
    The common objection to the idea of equal human dignity and value between a mature adult and an embryo in utero is the analogy of the acorn. Virtually no one would consider an acorn to be somehow “equal” to a full-grown oak tree, thus one ought not grant the embryo in utero the same personhood one grants to a full-grown adult. The key difference which renders the acorn analogy null is the fact that, at no matter what stage of human development, a human being’s right to live remains constant because the concept of personhood is not attached to maturity; that is to say, a child is no less a person than a fully developed adult. Even though there is no “‘magic moment’ of personhood” [Ethics] identifiable by scientists, the death of a toddler is always just as tragic (if not more so) as the death of an elderly person who has already lived a full and complete life.
    Simply put, “human value depends upon endowment rather than performance.” [Ethics] While the felling of an old, magnificent oak seems more tragic than the stamping out of a sapling (and this due to the vast difference in their performative abilities), the killing of a toddler and an adult is considered an “equal violation of the right to life despite their differences in age, maturity, [and] intelligence.” [Ethics] If this endowment occurs at conception (as scientists widely agree it does), then we ought to regard the life of the embryo as deserving of the same human rights owed to toddlers and the elderly.

If the definition of humanity and personhood is thus undeniable in utero, a new dilemma arises. To paraphrase George Orwell’s allegorical Joseph Stalin in Animal Farm, could it be true that “some [humans] are more equal than others”? The answer to most Americans who truly value personal autonomy should be an obvious answer in the negative, for what value does an individual’s right to autonomy truly have if it can be deposed by one who considered him or herself more “equal” than others?
    Yet this is exactly what we see happen when the mental happiness and material prosperity of any mother is regarded with more importance than her unborn child. Still, one must be careful not to demonize all mothers who seek abortions. After all, there is nothing easy about a pregnancy, and any pro-life advocate would be hard-pressed to win over a mother wavering between the decision to abort or not. As it is, some mothers deny the very title of “mother” in an attempt to detach their pregnancy from a part of their definition as autonomous individuals; notably, they desire to remain individuals unburdened by dependents. Kaczor suggests that this is entirely impossible though because, after all, there are actually three different forms of motherhood present during a woman’s pregnancy, and two of them are completely unavoidable. [Ethics] A woman is said to be a mother in a social sense, a genetic sense, and a gestational sense. The social sense only arises after the birth of her son or daughter. The genetic sense and gestational sense are inclusive in her identity from conception and forward.
    Thus the forms of motherhood in question for every woman are whether or not she desires to remain a mother in a continually gestational sense over a nine-month period or if she is willing to live the rest of her life as a mother in the social sense after birth. One alternative to abortion that cannot be stressed enough is that “the woman can put the child up for adoption.” [ Francis Beckwith, Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice, quoted in Ethics] As it is, it must be noted that this burden is one that “need only involve nine months of pregnancy.” All mothers are protected under safe-haven laws which allow them to give up their babies without fault to local fire or police stations as well as hospitals. Hence no mother is legally obligated to surrender her autonomous financial security to a potentially unwanted-dependent. Instead, she can relieve her burden to the state, and in so doing, preserve the human life while refraining from sacrificing her autonomy at a time when she is most fiscally or emotionally vulnerable.
    But even mothers that fear children as compromising to their financial security or emotional health must consider the fact that the decision to abort is not free from comparable consequences to seeing the unborn’s development to term. Kaczor notes that women “will, whatever they choose, have (and/or risk having) significant burdens” [Ethics] once they find themselves pregnant. While abortion may seem the easiest option, even those who defend abortion acknowledge that there are great psychological costs to abortion, namely the burden of guilt that is commonly associated with the idea of taking another’s life. Even if the children are unwanted, studies have shown that many “women who bring unwanted children to term on the whole do not manifest mental health problems.” [Ethics] On the other hand, women who choose abortions have been found by some studies to recurrently suffer from “substance abuse, eating disorders, guilt, and self-punishment, as well as a variety of physical complications including cervical injuries, perforated uterus, and cancer.” [Ethics] Obviously, further study into the correlation and causation of this data remains to be seen, but the mere suggestion of the risks involved ought to yield a more conservative approach to the choice to abortion.
    Even if it were not the potential physical and emotional ramifications that a pregnant woman feared most, the financial burdens ought to be considered more manageable than not. As adoption has already been suggested as an alternative to abortion, mothers ought to also consider the vast array of scholarships and grants specifically catered to helping pregnant mothers achieve their educational and vocational goals in life. [“Help for Single Moms to Buy a House,” accessed April 4] Having a child no longer means sacrificing one’s American dream with the help of federal aid. If anything, “single mother” may come to be the newest box to be added to grant and scholarship forms.
    Just like every married couple knows, one need not sacrifice personal autonomy in order to add a new relationship to one’s life. Even if that new relationship is undesirable, adoption waitlists are still eagerly awaiting more mothers to carry their pregnancies to term. And if personal autonomy truly is one of our highest values in America, then we ought to be respectful of every neighbor’s autonomy, especially the least of these.

Copyright © 2015 by Kyle Garza